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INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, city and county attorneys have
been acutely aware of the avalanche of decisions which have
abruptly modified the landscape of legislation on municipal
tort liability., The inability of municipalities to obtain insur-
t Deputy City Attorney, City of Minneapolis. Mr. Olson is an Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law. He received his J.D. from William
Mitchell College of Law in 1963. He also serves as Chairman of the Minnesota State
Bar Association, Committee on Urban, State, and Local Government.
1. After the Minnesota Supreme Court abolished municipal tort immunity in
1962, the legislature responded by enacting Minnesota Statute Chapter 466 (1963).
See infra note 7 and accompanying text. Since its enactment, the Minnesota Supreme
Court declared the worker's compensation exception to liability an unconstitutional
deprivation of equal protection in Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422
(Minn. 1985); has declared that even an attempt to procure insurance is sufficient,
under Minnesota Statute Section 466.06, to waive the defense of immunity up to the
amount stated in the policy in Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No.
656, 355 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1984); decided that the notice claim provision of Minne-
sota Statute Section 466.05 violated equal protection in Glassman v. Miller, 356
317
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ance has sharpened the debate, 2 usually centering on the issue
of who should bear the blame.3 At least three views have been
advanced. 4 One argues that there is no crisis. Another insists
that the insurance industry is guilty of mismanagement. 5 Per-
haps the most vocal group looks to the judicial system and its
response to issues of public liability.
6
Since the landmark decision in Spanel v. Mounds View School
District No. 621,7 four problematical phenomena have troubled
lawyers practicing public law. First, the policy of the legisla-
ture in preserving certain categories of immunity8 found in the
Municipal Tort Liability Act9 is rapidly eroding.' 0 Second, de-
fenses which were believed to have been established have been
modified in such a manner as to render them unserviceable to
public law practitioners."I Third, although Spanel rejected the
N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1984); modified the discretionary act defense in a series of cases
culminating in Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314, Braham, 289 N.W.2d
112 (Minn. 1979); and struck down the time limitation provision for commencement
of suit in Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1979).
2. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAw OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON TORT LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS, FIFTY FIRST ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE, 8 1986; see also J. PINE AND R. BICKEL, TORT LIABILITY TODAY: A GUIDE FOR
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, a joint publication of THE PUBLIC RISK AND INSUR-
ANCE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, Vii (1986).
3. See supra note 2, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON TORT LIABILITY AND THE
INSURANCE CRISIS, at 8-11.
4. See supra note 2. In a survey of 145 cities, the United States Conference of
Mayors, while not unanimous on causes and solutions, agreed that the problem was
pervasive and demanded immediate attention. Moreover, the cities polled were al-
most equally divided (49% and 42.8%) on whether the responsibility was assignable
to the insurance industry or to high jury awards. United States Conference of May-
ors, Municipal Liability Concerns: A 145 City Survey, 37 (1986).
5. See supra note 2, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON TORT LIABILITY AND THE
INSURANCE CRISIS. The Report notes that "[t]he New York State Governor's Advi-
sory Commmission on Liability Insurance . . . [has] found that 'the industry's poor
recent financial condition largely reflects self-inflicted wounds.' " The Report attrib-
utes the crisis to "unwise investment practices" of the insurance industry. Id. at 10.
6. In Minnesota the legislative effort at dealing with the crisis focused on
amendments to Minnesota Statute Chapter 466. See Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch.
455, 1986 Minn. Laws 840.
7. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
8. See MINN. STAT. § 466.03 (1986).
9. MINN. STAT. Chapter 466.
10. See, e.g., Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1985) (declaring
the worker's compensation exception to liability as an unconstitutional deprivation of
equal protection); Glassman v. Miller, 356 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1984)(striking down
the notice of claim provision of MINN. STAT. § 466.05 as violative of equal
protection).
11. The modification of the discretionary acts defense illustrates the point. To
understand the evolution of the defense, the reader should analyze several cases,
[Vol. 13
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rationale for preserving immunity, 12 they are continuing to be
applied to the exceptions.' 3 Finally, several new issues have
arisen regarding the waiver of liability limits and defenses in
procuring insurance. 14
In 1986, the Minnesota Legislature adopted Chapter 455,15
part of which attempted to respond to the erosion of municipal
tort immunity.' 6 Rather than quelling the debate, Chapter 455
will probably intensify it. New arguments are likely to be
raised by increasing the number of exceptions to liability for
municipal torts. State and local government immunity statutes
now have parallel provisions in response to claims that the dif-
ferences in the state and local statutes deny equal protection of
the laws.' 7 Oddly, while municipalities received increased pro-
including: Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1984); Cairl v. State, 323
N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314, Braham, 289
N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979); Susla v. State, 247 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1976); Williamson
v. Cain, 310 Minn. 59, 245 N.W.2d 242 (1976); Hansen v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn.
205, 214 N.W.2d 346 (1974); Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 287 Minn. 287, 178
N.W.2d 215 (1970); Silver v. City of Minneapolis, 284 Minn. 266, 170 N.W.2d 206
(1969) (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)); Johnson v. County of
Nicollet, 387 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Gonzales v. Hollins, 386 N.W.2d
842 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Ostendorf v. Kenyon, 347 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Bjorkquist v. City of Robbinsdale, 352 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Note that, in Bjorkquist, the court of appeals held that the discretionary acts defense
did not violate equal protection.
12. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
13. See, e.g., Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979)
(involving the special duty doctrine). Note, that in Spanel, the Minnesota Supreme
Court did not regard the financial impact of liability to be a persuasive argument for
preserving immunity. In Cracrafi, the court suggested that, "If such an expansion and
change of the law is to occur, it is better that the legislature act in this field .. to
consider the extent of the financial impact of such a basic change." Id. at 808.
14. There is increasing difficulty in understanding what constitutes the procure-
ment of insurance so as to effect a waiver of liability limitations and defenses. In
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independant School Dist. No. 656, 355 N.W.2d 413 (Minn.
1984), the court stated that "because the district attempted to obtain liability insurance
to cover the district and its employees, it has waived 'the defense of governmental
immunity to the extent of the liability stated in the policy.' " Id. at 420-21 (emphasis
added). In Wesala v. City of Virginia, 390 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals held that procurement of coverage through the League of
Minnesota Insurance Trust constitutes insurance and, therefore, waives governmen-
tal immunity. Id. at 287. The court noted, however, that the procurement of insur-
ance has no effect on the liability of the municipality beyond the coverage so
provided. Id.
15. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 455, 1986 Minn. Laws 840. Provisions of this
chapter amend Minnesota Statutes, chapter 466.
16. Sections 1, 2, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 85, and 90
are the provisions of chapter 455 that deal with governmental tort liability.
17. The new exceptions to local government immunity in chapter 455 have been
1987]
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tection, they are now prohibited from indemnifying and insur-
ing their officers and employees in claims for punitive
damages.' 8 It is premature to speculate on the effect of the
1986 amendments to the Municipal Tort Liability Act. At this
stage, all that can be done is to raise issues which public debate
and legal decisions must resolve.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY
A. Chapter 455.
The 1986 amendments to the state and local government
tort liability provisions in Chapter 455 represent an attempt to
make each level of government immune from liability for the
same kind of claim.19 The need for similarity was raised in
Glassman v. Miller.20 In Glassman, the supreme court held that
because the Municipal Tort Liability Act contained notice pro-
visions different from the state act,2 ' Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 466.05, subdivision 1 violated the equal protection
guarantees of the Minnesota Constitution22 and the Four-
taken, with minor changes, from Minnesota Statutes section 3.736. The court, in
Glassman, decided that no rational basis existed for the difference between the notice
provisions of the Municipal Tort Liability Act and the State Tort Liability act. 356
N.W. 2d at 656.
18. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 76, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 876.
19. See Longfellow, Ellen, 1986 Legislative Changes in Minnesota Tort Liability 10
(April 22, 1986)(on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office). This paper was
distributed to municipalities by the League of Minnesota Insurance Trust. The Trust
was authorized by Minnesota Statutes section 471.981, subdivision 3, (1984) to es-
tablish a group self-insurance program to pool risks and losses of governmental
units.
20. 356 N.W.2d 655, 656 (Minn. 1984); see also Naylor v. Minnesota Daily, 342
N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 1984). In Glassman,Justice Scott agreed with the conclusion
of the majority but added by concurring, that he was:
[T]roubled by the majority's failure to strike down the notice provisions of
such statutes in their entirety. While the majority opinion cures one level of
inequality - namely, the unreasonable distinction between the victims of
state torts and those of municipal torts - both this case and Naylor v. Minne-
sota Daily, 342 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 1984), accord preferential treatment to
government tortfeasors. Consequently, this distinguishes between victims
of governmental and private wrongdoers, in violation of the equal protec-
tion requirements of U.S. Const. amend [sic] XIV, § 1, and Minn. Const art.
I, § 2.
Glassman, 356 N.W.2d at 656.
21. MINN. STAT. § 3.736 (Supp. 1987).
22. Article I, Section 2 states, in part: "No member of this state shall be disen-
franchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen
thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers." MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 2.
[Vol. 13
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teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.23 Thus,
several sections of 1986 Session Laws, Chapter 455 attempt to
apply the same standards to municipalities that are applied to
the state.24  Others pertain mostly to claim payment
responsibilty.
25
1. Sections 1, 2, and 65 - Proprietary Functions.
Section 1 of Chapter 455 specifically eliminates the govern-
mental and proprietary distinction under section 3.736, subdi-
vision 1 for torts committed by the state.26 This distinction
was eliminated for torts of municipalities, their officers, em-
ployees, and agents by Section 466.02.27 Thus, the old distinc-
tion between governmental and proprietary functions that
existed prior to the enactment of Minnesota Statutes, Chapter
466, in 1963, has also been eliminated for tort claims against
the state.28 In BuJkin v. City of Duluth,29 the distinction was ap-
plied to snow or ice conditions on public sidewalks even
though the Municipal Tort Liability Act eliminated it in 1963.30
Nevertheless, the state tort liability act now clearly removes the
distinction in determining liability. 3
1
In the 1986 amendments to sections 2 and 65, subdivision 4,
23. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in part: "No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § § 1, 2, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, and
75, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 874-76.
25. See Tort Reform Act, ch.455, § § 64, 67, 77, 85, and 90, 1986 Minn. Laws
840, 874, 876, 877, 882, 884.
26. Section 1 of Chapter 455, 1986 Minn. Laws, adds the language "whether
arising out of a governmental or proprietary function" to subdivision 1, section 3.736
in Minnesota Statutes. But see Bufkin v. City of Duluth, 291 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn.
1980) where the Minnesota Supreme Court reintroduced the distinction in holding
the City of Duluth liable for ice and snow conditions on a public sidewalk where the
sidewalk led to an event promoted for profit. Whether this anomoly will be given
consideration in the future is doubtful.
27. MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (1984). The proprietary and governmental distinction
was eliminated in 1963. Municipal Tort Liability Act of 1963, ch. 798, 1963 Minn.
Laws 1396.
28. See Snider v. City of St. Paul, 51 Minn. 456, 53 N.W. 763 (1892) (probably the
first Minnesota case that recognized the distinction). See also Stein v. Regents of the
University of Minnesota, 282 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1979)(setting out factors for deter-
mining whether a hospital is a proprietary or governmental activity).
29. 291 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 1980).
30. See supra note 27.
31. The distinction between governmental and proprietary functions has applied
to numerous activities in the past.
19871
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of Chapter 455, immunity extends to snow or ice conditions on
a publicly owned sidewalk that does not abut a publicly owned
building or a publicly owned parking lot, except where the
condition is affirmatively caused by the negligent acts of the
municipality or state.32 In actions against municipalities or the
state, decisions on liability should not look to the type of city
or state function being performed in publicly owned buildings,
but to the negligent acts of the municipality or state relating to
ice or snow conditions on public sidewalks.
33
2. Section 64 -Joint Powers Boards.
Section 64, subdivision 1 now includes joint powers boards
or organizations created under Section 471.59 or other stat-
utes as "municipalities" subject to the defenses and liability
limitations in the Municipal Tort Liability Act.34 No Minnesota
Supreme Court case has dealt directly with the capacity of a
joint powers board or its members to sue or be sued, although
the capacity to be sued has been assumed. 35 Clarification of
the status of such boards was needed in view of their extensive
use in Minnesota to deal with inter-governmental problems. If
they are subject to suit, the defenses and liabilities in Minne-
sota Statutes, Chapter 466 will now apply to them.
3. Sections 66 and 72 - Parks.
Section 66 amends Section 466.03 by adding a new subdivi-
sion to provide immunity to municipalities for claims based
upon negligence in the construction, operation, or mainte-
nance of parks and recreational areas, and claims based on the
clearing and removal of refuse and the creation of nature
trails.3 6 The State Tort Liability Act confers similar immunity
32. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § § 2, 65, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 840, 874.
33. Id. Note that these provisions only grant immunity on non-abutting public
sidewalks where the condition is not affirmatively caused by the negligent acts of a
municipality or state employee. Id. Presumably, under these sections, liability may
be established where snow or ice conditions cause injuries as a result of negligent
omissions to remove them. See Robinson v. Hollatz, 374 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (snow plowing by the county held not to be a discretionary act).
34. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 64, subd. 1, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 874.
35. See Local Gov't. Information Sys. v. Village of New Hope, 248 N.W.2d 316
(Minn. 1976).
36. Chapter 455, section 66 provides that immunity applies to:
Any claim based upon the construction, operation, or maintenance of any
property owned or leased by the municipality that is intended or permitted
to be used as a park, as an open area for recreational purposes, or for the
[Vol. 13
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on the state.37 The defense applies to claims by users of parks
and recreational areas. 38 Immunity is expanded under Section
3.736, subdivision 3(g) and Section 466.03, subdivision 6(b) in
cases where claims or losses have been caused by the condition
of unimproved real property.
39
4. Section 67 - Nonpersonal and Nonproperty Losses.
Section 67 corresponds to section 3.736, subdivision 3(b) of
the State Tort Liability Act, and provides immunity from any
claim for loss other than injury to or loss of property, personal
injury, or death.40 Inferentially, claims for deprivations of lib-
erty, as in false arrest cases, are now granted immunity under
the Municipal Tort Liability Act. 41 If this provision is upheld,
the claim is likely to be made that since there is no post-depri-
vation remedy available under state law, such deprivations
must be redressed under federal law. 42 Unlike the state, mu-
nicipalities have had increasing exposure to Section 1983
claims since 1978.
4 3
provision of recreational services, or from any claim based on the clearing of
land, removal of refuse, and creation of trails or paths without artificial sur-
faces, if the claim arises from a loss incurred by a user of park and recreation
property or services. Nothing in this subdivision limits the liability of a mu-
nicipality for conduct that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a
private person.
Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 66, Minn. Laws 840, 874.
37. MINN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 3(h)(1984).
38. See supra note 35.
39. See Hovet v. City of Bagley, 325 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1982) (the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the Minnesota Recreational Use Statute, MINN. STAT.
§§ 87.01 - .03 (1980), did not apply to cities as "owners," where a diver sustained
paralyzing injuries when he made a running dive into shallow water from a dock at
the beach owned and operated by the City of Bagley). See also Milligan v. City of
Laguna Beach, 34 Cal.3d 829, 670 P.2d 1121, 196 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1983). Under a
statute similar to section 466.03, subdivision 6(b), a mother and daughter brought
suit against the municipality after a tree from nearby municipal property fell on their
house. The California Supreme Court concluded that only users of the property
were barred from making claims. Since the plaintiffs were non-users, the claim for
liability could be made. In Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld as consti-
tutional a statute establishing a presumption that a skier's collision with any object or
person on a ski slope was the skier's sole responsibility. Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Dev.
Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
40. Chapter 455, section 67, confers immunity for "[Alny claim for a loss other
than injury to or loss of property or personal injury or death." Tort Reform Act, ch.
455, § 67, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 874.
41. See infra note 42.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
43. In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided that municipalities are
19871
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5. Section 68 - Entitlement Claims.
Section 6844 is a verbatim reproduction of section 3.736,
subdivision 3(i) which provides immunity for claims arising out
of loss of benefits, compensation under public assistance, or
welfare programs unless the payment is mandated as a condi-
tion to receipt of federal grants-in-aid. Since counties have
primary responsibility for the administration of these pro-
grams, this section will have less effect on cities than on
counties.
6. Sections 69 and 90 - Licensing.
New immunity is provided to municipalities by section 69
from claims or losses based upon the failure of any person to
meet the standards needed for a license, permit, or other au-
thorizations issued by the municipality or its agents.45 This
corresponds to Section 3.736, subdivision 3(j) in the State Tort
Liability Act. 4 6 In Andrade v. Ellefson,4 7 the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals in holding that a county,
"persons" subject to liability under section 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social
Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 662-700 (1978).
The issue is raised because recent decisions recognize that it is only where there
has been an adequate post-deprivation hearing or remedy that section 1983 will be
applied. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The United States
Supreme Court held that:
[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee
does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post depriva-
tion remedy for the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent depri-
vations of property by state employees, the state's action is not complete
until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post deprivation
remedy.
Hudson, 468 U.S. 517, 533. See also Hubenthal v. County of Winona, 751 F.2d 243
(8th Cir. 1984); Winnick v. Chisago County Board of Commissioners, 389 N.W.2d
546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Municipalities do not have the eleventh amendment pro-
tections afforded to states and state agencies. Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
44. Chapter 455, § 68, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 875.
45. Chapter 455, section 69 confers immunity for "[A]ny claim for a loss based
on the failure of any person to meet the standards needed for a license, permit, or
other authorization issued by the municipality or its agents." Tort Reform Act, ch.
455, § 69, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 875.
46. Minnesota Statutes, section 3.736, subdivision 3(j) declares that the state and
its employees are not liable for:
Any loss based on the failure of any person to meet the standards needed
for a license, permit, or other authorization issued by the state or its agents;
47. 391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986).
[Vol. 13
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when acting on behalf of the state in inspecting day care facili-
ties for state licensure, was immune from tort liability under
Section 3.736, subdivision 3(j).48 The Minnesota Supreme
Court noted that the issue had been directly responded to by
the 1986 Amendments.
49
Section 90 would have required indemnification of the
county by the state in Andrade since, for indemnification pur-
poses, municipalities are made "employees" of the state.50 In
Andrade, however, the liability had been waived because Anoka
County had purchased insurance.5 t The issue of what consti-
tutes "procurement of insurance" has not yet been addressed
by the legislature. In Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independent School
Dist. No. 656,52 the court decided that the employer had no
duty to indemnify an employee, although a duty exists to de-
fend the employee where malfeasance or willful or wanton ne-
glect of duty could be found. The court also held that even
though the insurance policy of the school district excluded
coverage of the employee's tort, "because the district attempted
to obtain liability insurance to cover the district and its em-
ployees, it has waived 'the defense of governmental immunity
to the extent of the liability stated in the policy.' "53
As a result of the insurance crisis, 54 many municipalities have
either become self-insured or have joined the League of Min-
nesota Cities Insurance Trust.5 5 Although Illinois seems to
48. Id. at 840.
49. In Andrade, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in footnote 7, stated that:
Under the 1986 Tort Reform Act, the Minnesota Legislature has ...ad-
dressed this problem. Minn. Stat. § 466.03 has been amended to add a new
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity for claims based on
licenses issued by a municipality. See 1986 Minn. Laws Ch. 455, § 69, effec-
tive July 1, 1986. See also a new section, Minn. Stat. § 466.132 (1986), relat-
ing to indemnification of a municipality when acting as an employee of the
state.
Id. at 843.
50. Id. at 840.
51. Id. at 843 n. 7.
52. 355 N.W.2d 413, (Minn. 1984)(emphasis added); see supra note 14.
53. Id. at 420-21 & n.9.
54. See supra notes 2 and 5. The REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON TORT LIABILITY
AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS notes that the crisis began when interest rates fell. The
Report blames the insurance industry for the crisis in its aggressive efforts to bring in
premium dollars to invest during the late 1970's and early 1980's. In the process, the
Report states,"[the insurance industry] sacrificed sound underwriting methods." See
also supra note 9.
55. In the survey of 145 cities, it was reported that more than half self-insure for
at least a portion of comprehensive general and police-professional coverage. Eight-
19871
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have reached a different result, 56 it apparently is the only other
state to have dealt with the issue as to what constitutes the pro-
curement of insurance. In Wesala v. City of Virginia,5 7 the court
of appeals held that participation by a city in the League of
Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust constitutes the procurement
of insurance, thereby waiving governmental immunity. 58 If the
view expressed in Wesala remains unchanged cities would have
available the defenses in the Municipal Tort Liability Act if
they were uninsured or self-insured, but would lose them when
they obtained coverages under the League of Minnesota Cities
Insurance Trust.
This result is particularly troublesome to cities because of
the absence of any decision as to whether self-insurance is the
equivalent of "procurement of insurance", especially in view of
a recent Montana decision striking down the tort liability limi-
tations of cities. 59 Only immediate legislative clarification can
establish whether the policy of the state to add defenses em-
een cities reported they were uninsured for one or more policies. Rochester, Minne-
sota, reported no insurance coverage for public officials "when the only coverage
available rose nearly 600 percent from the previous year." As a result of high premi-
ums or the inability to obtain suitable coverages, cities have turned to the League of
Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust, which is authorized to pool municipal risk under
Minnesota Statutes, section 471.981, subdivision 3 (1986).
56. See Antiporek v. Village of Hillside, 482 N.E.2d 415 (I1. App. 1985), where
the court held that tort defenses were waived only where the risk of loss was covered
by a commercial insurance company. The court construed two statutory provisions
together and stated that "[t]his interpretation is consistent with the public policy con-
cern 'of protecting public funds and property and preventing the diversion of tax
monies from their intended purpose to payment of damages claims.' " Id. at 417.
(quoting Melbourne v. City of Chicago, 76 Il1. App. 3d 595, 609, 394 N.E.2d 1291,
1301 (1979)). See also Beckus v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 78 Ill. App.3d 558, 561, 397
N.E.2d 175, 178 (11. App. 1979). A $50,000 claim was denied to an injured minor
under the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act. Id. at 561, 397 N.E.2d at 178. There a school board had procured coverage for
liability in excess of $1,000,000, per occurrence, but had no insurance for smaller
claims, which it could have chosen to do under the Act. Id. at 561, 397 N.E.2d at 176.
57. 390 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
58. See id. at 287, 288. Note that, under Minnesota Statutes, section 466.06, in-
surance may be procured to cover (1) torts for which the municipality is immune
under section 466.03, and (2) claims in excess of the limits stated in section 466.04.
Thus, two areas of immunity are included in the statute - one dealing with defenses
to claims, the other dealing with dollar limitations. Wesala deals with the waiver of
the defense of governmental immunity, as did Antiporek.
59. Several cases have upheld the liability limits in cases where such limits have
been challenged as violating equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., Sefert v. Standard
Paving Co., 64 Ili.2d 109, 355 N.E.2d 537 (1976); State v. Silva, 478 P.2d 501 (Nev.
1971); Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1979); Crowe v.
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bodied in the 1986 amendments is consistent with the elimina-
tion of those defenses by insuring through the League of
Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust.
7. Sections 70 and 71 - Institutional Care.
These sections confer immunity on municipalities where
losses are based on lack of proper care or treatment, loss or
damage to property of patients or inmates of county and city
institutions. 60 This immunity will apply to municipal hospitals,
correctional facilities, and jails and detoxification centers.6' It
is the same as section 3.736, subdivision 3(k) and 3(l).62
8. Section 73 - Peace Officers.
Although identical to section 3.736, subdivision 3(m), sec-
tion 73 is an unnecessary addition in Chapter 455, since it was
already adopted as Section 466.03, subdivision 6a in 1982
Laws, chapter 423, Section 13.63 This section provides immu-
nity to peace officers of the state and its political subdivisions
from both civil and criminal liability, when the peace officer
acts in good faith and exercises due care in the care or custody
of a motor vehicle taken during an arrest for driving under the
influence. Since the issues of good faith and due care are req-
uisites to immunity, it is not certain that greater protection is
added. If the peace officer exercises due care, presumably in a
motion for summary judgment, the peace officer would likely
prevail in any event since there would be no lack of due care
John W. Harton Memorial Hosp., 579 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. 1979); Stanhope v.
Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979).
Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985), however, struck down the limitations
under the Montana statute. In Minnesota, the issue was argued in Ahrenholz v. Hen-
nepin County, 295 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1980). However, the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided the case on other grounds.
60. Chapter 455, section 70 adds a new immunity for "[a]ny claim for a loss
based on the usual care and treatment, or lack of care and treatment, of any person at
a municipal hospital or corrections facility where reasonable use of available funds
has been made to provide care." Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 70, 1986 Minn. Laws
840, 875. Section 71 creates immunity for "[a]ny claim for a loss, damage, or destruc-
tion of property of a patient or inmate of a municipal institution." Id. § 71, 1986
Minn. Laws at 875.
61. See id.
62. Note that these provisions do not appear to cover personal injuries. See also
Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 247 N.W.2d 907 (1976).
63. Both sections provide immunity for "[any claim for a loss for which recovery
is prohibited by Minnesota Statutes, section 169.121, subdivision 8."
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upon which a negligence claim could be based. Whether the
addition of a showing of "good faith" adds a higher level of
care than "due care" is equally unclear.
9. Section 74 - Other Immunity.
Whether section 7464 adds additional protection to munici-
palities is doubtful. This section provides that municipalities
are immune from liability, if under section 3.736, the state
would be immune for the same claim. This section appears to
merely duplicate the immunity expressly provided for in the
Municipal Tort Liability Act.65
10. Section 75 - Notice Requirements.
Section 7566 responds to the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision in Glassman.67 The notice provisions in the Municipal
Tort Liability Act are made equal to those in the State Tort
Liability Act. 68 This amendment is likely to be evaluated by
the equal protection views expressed in Bernthal v. City of St.
Paul69 and in the concurring opinion of Justice Scott in Glass-
man.7 0 In Bernthal, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down
Minnesota Statutes, section 466.03, subdivision 2 which had
preserved immunity to municipalities from tort actions
brought by persons covered under the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act. 7' Based upon its equal protection reasoning, the
64. Chapter 455, section 74 provides immunity for "[any claim against a munici-
pality, if the same claim would be excluded under section 3.736, if brought against
the state." Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 74, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 875.
65. If the intent of this section is to make the same immunity available to munici-
palities and their employees as have been available to the state and its employees,
then many of the provisions in the 1986 Amendments appear redundant. Perhaps
the best solution is to adopt a single state and Municipal Tort Liability Act covering
all units of government.
66. Chapter 455, section 75 amended the notice of claim provisions in Minnesota
Statutes, section 466.05, subdivision 1 and 2, of the Municipal Tort Liability Act by
both adding and deleting language. Tort Reform Act, ch. 455, § 75, 1986 Minn. Laws
840, 875-76. Notices in claims for wrongful death remain unchanged.
67. See supra note 10.
68. See MINN. STAT. § 466.05 and 3.736, subds. 5 and 6.
69. 376 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1985).
70. See supra note 20.
71. Bernthal, 376 N.W.2d at 426 (this exception from liability was enacted in
1963). In 1970, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in McCarty v. Village of Nashwauk,
286 Minn. 240, 175 N.W.2d 144 (1970) recognized that a municipality was immune
from liability on any claim for damages as a result of injuries when the activity giving
rise to the claim was covered by the Worker's Compensation Act.
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court held that no rational basis could be established for classi-
fying public tort claims differently from private torts in apply-
ing the Worker's Compensation Act. 72 In Glassman, Justice
Scott rejected the idea that the notice provisions should pro-
vide preferential treatment to governmental tortfeasors.
73
Thus, the enactment of section 75 may have expanded the
equal protection debate.
11. Section 76 - Punitive Damages.
Perhaps the most controversial section in the municipal tort
provisions of Chapter 455 is section 76.74 It prohibits a munic-
ipality from indemnifying or insuring its officers or employees
for punitive damages claims 75 levied against them. It, does,
however, authorize defending the employee or officer "as a
necessary incident to other elements of a defense." 76 It is clear
that punitive damages cannot be awarded against a municipal-
ity77 or the state.78 The status of employees and officers is less
certain.
In Herrman v. Fossum,79 the Minnesota Supreme Court recog-
nized that municipalities are not subject to punitive damages. 80
In Douglas v. City of Minneapolis,8 1 the court decided that police
officers in Minneapolis who were successfully sued under fed-
eral law could be indemnified by the city under Minnesota Stat-
72. 376 N.W.2d at 426.
73. See supra note 20.
74. Chapter 455, section 76 provides that "[a] municipality may not save harm-
less, indemnify or insure an officer or employee for punitive damages levied against
the officer or employer. [sic] The municipality may provide a defense against a claim
for punitive damages as a necessary incident to other elements of a defense." Tort
Reform Act, ch. 455, § 76, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 876.
75. Note that "punitive damages" means "... a willful indifference to the rights
or safety of others." MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1 (1986). Under the Municipal
Tort Liability Act, section 466.07, indemnificaton of officers and employees does not
"apply in the case of malfeasance in office or wilful or wanton neglect of duty."
MINN. STAT. § 466.07, subd. 2 (1963). The state tort liability law does not permit
indemnification "in case of malfeasance in office or willful or wanton actions or ne-
glect of duty." The question arises as to whether punitive damages can be awarded
and indemnification allowed under Section 549.20 even though the acts of the officer
or employee do not fit the language of state and Municipal Tort Liability Acts. The
variation in language presumptively creates different standards.
76. See supra note 71.
77. MINN. STAT. § 466.04, subd. 1 (1986).
78. MINN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 3 (1986).
79. 270 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. 1978).
80. See Id. at 18.
81. 304 Minn. 259, 230 N.W.2d 577 (1975).
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utes, section 471.45.82 The United States District Court found
that the arrests "were improperly motivated, undertaken not in
furtherance of good faith law enforcement [and] for the pur-
pose of harrassing those at the gathering because of their polit-
ical beliefs . *..."83 Douglas held that the city could come to
contrary conclusions in exercising its discretion to indemnify
and could do so if the action was found by the city to have
occurred in the performance of duty and did not arise as a re-
sult of " 'malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of
duty.' "84 The court held that the fact that punitive damages
could not be paid by the city if it were held liable did not pre-
vent such awards and indemnification thereof against officers
and employees of the city. 85
Wilson v. City of Eagan8 6 confirms the Douglas case, but it does
so under chapter 466 for a state tort claim.8 7 Horace Mann,88
states that " 'malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect
of duty'. . . releases the school district from its duty of indemni-
fying its employee[s] .... "89 In a footnote, the court stated
that if such conduct is found, indemnification is "barred." 90
Thus, the question remains whether the city can come to a dif-
ferent conclusion on the facts for indemnification purposes
than the court may have found at the trial. This uncertainty in
the cases has led to the outright prohibition of indemnification
in Section 76.91 When viewed in the context of the need for
certainty and security in the delivery of public services, espe-
cially in law enforcement, legislative modification and clarifica-
tion can be expected. 9
2
82. Id. at 270, 230 N.W.2d at 585.
83. Id. at 264, 230 N.W.2d at 582.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980).
87. Id. at 148-50.
88. See supra note 14.
89. 355 N.W.2d at 421 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 420 n.9.
91. See supra note 70. Note, however, that enactment of the prohibition to save
harmless, indemnify, or insure officers or employees for punitive damages was not
accompanied by a repeal of Minnesota Statutes, section 471.44 and 471.45 which
authorized defense and indemnification of police officers in cases involving "alleged
false arrest or alleged injury to person, property or character .... Whether these
provisions conflict or can be harmonized with Chapter 455, section 76 must be deter-
mined in an appropriate case, unless the legislature first clarifies its intent.
92. Section 76 appears to adopt Horace Mann, and reverses Douglas and Wilson,
unless Wilson can be construed as allowing punitive damage awards for cases in inten-
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Under Section 82, Minnesota Statutes section 549.191 has
been amended to require that before a claim for punitive dam-
ages can be alleged in a complaint, a separate hearing must be
held to establish that a factual basis exists to support the
claim. 93 This provision is an attempt to eliminate the pleading
of frivolous punitive damage claims. Its success at eliminating
such claims at the early stages of cases will depend upon judi-
cial notions of what is necessary to establish prima facie evi-
dence to support the claim.
12. Section 77 - Custodial Medical Expenses.
In L.P. Medical Specialists, Ltd. v. St. Louis County9 4 persons ar-
rested by city police were injured and transported to a county
jail. The county was held responsible for the expenses. Sec-
tion 77 clarifies that it is "the municipality responsible for hir-
ing, firing, training, and control of the law enforcement and
other employees involved in the arrest" who would be respon-
sible for the expenses. 95 If this provision had been operative
in L.P. Medical Specialists, the city would have paid the expenses.
13. Section 85 -Joint and Several Liability.
Under the doctrine ofjoint and several liability, once the in-
dividual liability of multiple defendants is ascertained, each de-
fendant is liable for an indivisible injury to the plaintiff in the
tional tort where "malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of duty" is not
found.
93. 1986 Minn. Laws, Chapter 455, Section 82 added a new section to read:
Upon commencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek punitive
damages. After filing the suit a party may make a motion to amend the
pleadings to claim punitive damages. The motion must allege the applica-
ble legal basis under section 549.20 or other law for awarding punitive dam-
ages in the action and must be accompanied by one or more affidavits
showing the factual basis for the claim. At the hearing on the motion, if the
court finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion, the court shall
grant the moving party permission to amend the pleadings to claim punitive
damages. For purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, pleadings
amended under this section relate back to the time the action was
commenced.
94. 379 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
95. Chapter 455, section 77 in its entirety provides that "[w]hen costs are as-
sessed against a municipality for injuries incurred or other medical expenses con-
nected with the arrest of individuals violating Minnesota Statutes, the municipality
responsible for the hiring, firing, training, and control of the law enforcement and
other employees involved in the arrest is responsible for those costs." Tort Reform
Act, ch. 455, § 77, 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 877.
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entire amount of the award. 96 Thus, the insolvency of one of
the defendants does not prevent the recovery of the total
award from another defendant. Section 85 was enacted in re-
sponse to efforts to abolish joint and several liability for gov-
ernmental units. 97 The amendment, however, represents a
compromise position under which the state or municipality, if
found to be jointly liable with other tortfeasors, must not pay
more than twice the amount of fault, provided that the fault of
the state or municipality is less than 35 percent.98 As a conse-
quence, if the fault of the governmental unit is 35 percent or
greater, it may be jointly and severally liable for the entire
award. Plaintiffs will probably argue that no rational basis ex-
ists for distinguishing between governmental and other
tortfeasors. Consequently, an equal protection challenge can
be anticipated. 99
B. The Special Duty Doctrine.
In Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 00 the Minnesota Supreme
Court applied the special duty doctrine' 0 1 in a claim for negli-
gence by a city inspector for failure to discover a violation of
the municipal fire code. The special duty doctrine recognizes a
standard of care owed to individuals as opposed to the public
generally.' 0 2 In Cracraft, the court adopted a four factor test.
0 3
96. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (1984).
97. Chapter 455, section 85, amended Minnesota Statutes, section 604.02, subdi-
vision 1 by adding the language: "If the state or a municipality as defined in section
466.01 is jointly liable, and its fault is less than 35 percent, it is jointly and severally
liable for an amount no greater than twice the amount of fault." Tort Reform Act,
ch. 455, § 85 1986 Minn. Laws 840, 882.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 10 and 20.
100. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
101. In Cracraft, "special duty" was defined as "nothing more than convenient ter-
minology, in contradistinction to 'public duty' for the ancient doctrine that once a
duty to act for the protection of others is voluntarily assumed, due care must be
exercised even though there was no duty to act in the first instance." Id. at 806.
102. The court stated, that the question is
At what point ... does the municipality assume to act for the protection of
others as distinguished from acting for itself when it inspects the activities of
third parties . . .?
Id.
103. The four factors are:
(1) [A]ctual knowledge of the dangerous condition is a factor which tends
to impose a duty of care on the municipality.
(2) [R]easonable reliance by persons on the municipality's representations
and conduct tends to impose a duty of care... [Tihe reasonable reli-
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The court reviewed the record and found "no evidence . . .
that a duty was assumed, or a special duty created" to the
plaintiffs for injury and death when an unnoticed fifty-five gal-
lon drum of volatile liquid exploded on a high school loading
dock. 104
The most recent consideration of the special duty doctrine,
in Andrade v. Ellefson, t0 5 illustrates the difficulty in applying the
four-factor test. In Andrade, the plaintiffs claimed that a special
relation existed between Anoka County and the plaintiffs
which placed a special duty of due care on the county in per-
forming its license and supervision functions relating to a day
care home. 10 6 The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that a
special duty had been created. 10 7 The court considered each
of the four factors, and concluded that a single factor was deci-
sive,10 8 stating:
Of the four Cracraft factors, the first factor is arguably met
partially, but the third factor - the statutory mandate to pro-
tect a certain class - is definitely met, and this third factor is
so overwhelmingly dominant that we have no difficulty in
finding a "special relation" exists between the county and
the small children in the day care homes that it inspects for
licensure.10 9
Andrade, therefore, appears to focus on whether the Public
Welfare Licensing Act' 10 intended to create a particular pro-
tected class."' This analysis should be compared with Ray-
mond v. Baehr, 1 2 in which negligence per se was found where a
violation of the city building code by an individual defendant
ance must be based on specific actions or representations which cause
the persons to forgo other alternatives of protecting themselves.
(3) [A] duty of care may be created by an ordinance or statute that sets
forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of
persons rather than the public as a whole.
(4) [T]he municipalities must use due care to avoid increasing the risk of
harm.
Id. at 806-07. Note that in Cracraft, the court does not state that this factor must
be found with one of the other three. Id.
104. Id. at 806.
105. 391 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1986).
106. Id. at 837.
107. Id. at 843.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. MINN. STAT. §§ 245.781-.87 (1986).
111. 391 N.W.2d at 843.
112. 282 Minn. 109, 163 N.W.2d 51 (1968).
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caused a fire in a commercial building." 3 The court stated,
"[i]t seems clear that plaintiffs as tenants and the employee of
a tenant of the building are within the class of persons the
building code was designed to protect."" 4 Policy reasons ob-
viously should be clarified to differentiate the responsibility of
private persons in complying with ordinance and statute provi-
sions and the responsibility of government inspectors in licens-
ing and supervision under the same provisions. If
predictability is to be served by these decisions, the line must
become brighter.
CONCLUSION
The policy differences implicit in the Municipal Tort Liabil-
ity Act and in court decisions interpreting the language of the
Act do not appear to be narrowing. Whether the 1986 immu-
nity amendments to chapter 466 have significantly added to
the protection of municipalities will ultimately be decided judi-
cially. Current court decisions involving waiver of defenses
and liability limitations may cause municipalities to ask
whether they are better off without insurance. Possibly, a dif-
ferent view of equal protection will emerge, or the courts may
begin to recognize that exposure to risk is different, greater, or
both in the public sector compared to private sector torts.
Whatever the outcome, municipal tort liability and immunity
will continue to remain volatile for some time and municipali-
ties must continue to cope with the uncertainty in dealing ap-
propriately with the risk to the municipalities themselves and
their officers and employees.
113. Id. at 113, 163 N.W.2d at 54.
114. Id. See Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981) (liability claims were
rejected for negligent fire inspection of a hotel by the state and city of Breckenridge);
Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158 (1972)
(the court refused to impose liability for injuries allegedly sustained in a fire as a
result of defective stairways in violation of the city building code).
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